A fter 25 years in power, Vladimir Putin has presided over Russia longer than any Kremlin ruler except Stalin. Despite economic crisis, overseas military conflicts, an armed uprising, and harsh Western sanctions, Putin has never been seriously threatened in his rule. But by mid-2026, a new type of challenge will emerge — not from tanks on the streets and competing politicians, but from empty gas stations, budget cuts, and a political elite that quietly prepares for a future beyond Putin. Whether 2026 marks "the end of the Putin era" depends on whether one is looking at the Russia Putin talks about in public statements or the Russia everyday Russians experience.
Russia's economy, despite expectations that it would fall apart, managed to survive the first three years of the invasion of Ukraine thanks to the high prices on energy sources and an artificial increase in expenditures on weapons and ammunition. The second stage has arrived.
Economic growth has dropped to around 1 percent; the budget received less funding in 2025 than expected for the first time after the coronavirus pandemic. In early 2026, the Russian government increased the value-added tax to 22 percent to make up for lost budget revenues. Revenue from oil and gas exports—the basis of the Russian budget before the war—decreased significantly in early 2026 due to the drop in international prices and increased sanctions on Russian products.
The most obvious manifestation is fuel. For several months already, Ukraine has been attacking Russia’s oil refineries with long-range drones, and in mid-2026, more than half of the territories of the country have started rationing gasoline, with long lines, price hikes, and a complete sales ban in occupied Crimea. Even President Putin himself acknowledges the fact of the shortage of fuel, calling it “not critical” but admitting that Russians are having troubles getting it. It is worth noting that it is the first time when the war has affected the lives of ordinary people in Russia, who traded their freedoms for order and cheap fuel.
According to economists from the Kiel Institute, Russia's major problem is not lack of funds but capacity, as sanctions prevent the country from creating a necessary workforce and spare parts for refineries. Such a situation will continue for many years even after the end of the war.
There has been no public declaration by Putin of any intention to leave office. He was granted new constitutional changes in 2020, which would permit him to stay in office as the president till 2036.
But there seems to be some other change taking place within the political system itself. There are analysts who observe Kremlin moves and believe that an effort is being made to prepare a new generation for power by way of this year's State Duma elections, due to take place in September, with many of the seats being allocated to people who fought the war in Ukraine along with some young bureaucrats.
The names often cited by the speculation on who will become Putin’s successor include:
Alexei Dyumin, a bodyguard turned secretary of the State Council and one of Putin’s closest advisors; Nikolai Patrushev, an experienced head of the security service and FSB; and young technocrats, such as Dmitry Chernyshenko and Kirill Dmitriev, who gained their reputations as advisors dealing with Washington. There are also officials from the security service, such as FSB director Alexander Bortnikov; however, his age is similar to Putin's, so he will face the same problem of “succession of one old man for another” that the Soviet regime faced in the 1980s.
Analysts of Russian foreign policy are not shy about saying that none of these scenarios imply reforms. Russia’s political elites will not want to see any kind of reforms that resemble those implemented by Gorbachev—reforms that led to the country’s collapse and disaster for the majority of the population. Whatever successor will come to power after Putin, he will have to deal within the very same system created by Putin.
Nevertheless, the market is not anticipating a Putin departure in the near term. According to Polymarket as of early July 2026, traders believe that there is a probability of 10 to 12 percent that Putin will leave the presidency in the upcoming months. This may be considered an increase from earlier in the year but shows that there is still substantial optimism about the status quo.
The reasons behind this are rather obvious: there is no upcoming election, there is no orderly transition, and there is no apparent divide between Putin’s security establishment supporters.
However, there have been observers who believe that the West is posing the wrong question by asking not if Putin will be overthrown but how the system that created him reacts when it decides that he has served his purpose. In an opinion article published recently, Putin's ability to survive and thrive over Western politicians for two decades because of his value to Russia's national security apparatus has become increasingly irrelevant in light of an ongoing, economically damaging war. Among the potential triggers for a fast repricing according to the market, analysts point to Putin's confirmed health problem, a peace settlement that undermines Putin politically, or the defection of military and business elite members from him.
